The Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE) has expressed its “strong concern” over the conclusions presented by the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Laila Medina, in the case that will determine the extent to which the right to erasure under the GDPR may apply to the Catholic Church’s baptismal registers.
The conclusions, published on 1 October in case C-12/25, Bisdom Gent, maintain that the right to erasure provided for in European data-protection law may, in principle, apply to the personal data contained in those registers. However, they do not recognise a general or automatic right to have them erased: each case would require balancing the rights of the individual concerned against the institutional autonomy and religious freedom of the Church.
The COMECE Secretariat reacted on Monday, 5 October, warning of the consequences that Medina’s thesis could have if ultimately adopted by the Court. The body particularly questions the view that, when retention of the data cannot be justified, simply noting the wish to leave the Church or redacting the information while still allowing it to be read would no longer be considered sufficient.
An opinion that is not yet the CJEU judgment
The case originated in Belgium, where a person baptised in the Catholic Church asked the Diocese of Ghent to remove all references to them from its registers and archives, invoking the General Data Protection Regulation.
The diocese recorded the person’s departure from the Church and redacted their personal data, while keeping them legible. The individual then turned to the Belgian Data Protection Authority, which ordered their erasure. The diocese appealed the decision, and the Belgian court hearing the case referred several questions on the interpretation of the GDPR to the CJEU.
Advocate General Laila Medina considers that baptismal registers constitute a structured set of personal data and are therefore subject to the GDPR. This does not mean, however, that every person who requests it has the right to have their data removed from the baptismal register.
According to Medina, once a request for erasure has been made, the Church could continue to retain the data if it demonstrates that there are compelling legitimate grounds justifying it. Among these, the Advocate General accepts that ensuring the proper administration of the sacraments—including the fact that Baptism can be received only once—may constitute one such ground.
Nevertheless, it would be for the national court to determine whether retaining the data is necessary to achieve that objective and whether the Church’s interest prevails over the rights and freedoms of the individual concerned. The matter must therefore be examined on a case-by-case basis.
National courts would have to weigh, on the one hand, the right to privacy, the protection of personal data and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the individual concerned and, on the other, the autonomy of the Church and its own religious freedom.
Medina further considers that, in carrying out this balancing exercise, account may be taken of the possible impact that retaining the data may have on a person wishing to dissociate themselves from a religious community, including, in certain circumstances, possible emotional suffering. This reasoning has been expressly questioned by COMECE, which considers these considerations “unconvincing.”
It should be emphasised that these conclusions do not constitute a judgment and are not binding on the CJEU judges. The role of Advocates General is to propose, independently, a legal solution to certain cases brought before the Court. The judges have now begun their deliberations and will deliver judgment at a later date.
The point that concerns COMECE
COMECE’s main concern arises in the scenario where a court finds that the Church has not established sufficient grounds for continuing to process a particular person’s data.
Medina maintains that, in such a case, redacting the name and other personal data while leaving them legible, even accompanied by a note recording the departure from the Church, would not amount to true erasure for the purposes of the GDPR.
The identifying data would have to be rendered illegible to the extent necessary to ensure that the person is no longer identified or can no longer be easily identified. Information that a baptism took place at a particular place and date could, however, be retained. Nor would it be necessary to physically tear a page from the register: procedures could be used that conceal the personal data while preserving the remaining information intact.
Even in the event that the Church could not justify retaining the data on grounds relating to the administration of the sacraments, Medina contemplates another possible basis for keeping them: their retention for archiving purposes in the public interest or for historical research. For this, however, the conditions and safeguards provided for by European and national law would have to be met.
It is precisely the possibility that identifying data may have to be rendered illegible that has prompted COMECE’s reaction.
The body recalls that the practice of adding a marginal annotation to the register has been accepted as an appropriate legal solution in various legal systems of the Member States and warns that making identifying data disappear substantially changes the nature of the document.
“Erasing the baptised person’s first name and surname from the baptismal register completely deprives the baptismal register, as such, of its meaning, value and purpose,” the Commission maintains.
COMECE also considers that insufficient account has been taken of the consequences that such erasure could have on the interests and rights of third parties. Its objection stems from the very nature of baptismal registers: they do not merely record the present will to belong or not to belong to the Church, but attest to a baptism that was actually celebrated.
Legal uncertainty for European dioceses
COMECE fears that the approach proposed by Medina could generate “significant legal uncertainty” for the ecclesiastical institutions responsible for processing these data in all Member States of the European Union.
According to the body, the problem affects registers that constitute “a central pillar” of the Church’s internal functioning and organisation and that are essential for it to carry out its mission.
The Advocate General herself acknowledges the weight of this ecclesial autonomy. Her conclusions expressly state that the balancing exercise cannot be carried out in the abstract and that the courts must take into account the particular circumstances of each request.
COMECE nevertheless considers the guidance provided to be insufficient and hopes that the future CJEU judgment will establish a line more favourable to the protection of baptismal registers against requests for erasure. Its Legal Affairs Commission is now studying Medina’s conclusions in detail with a view to possibly drafting a position paper on the matter.
Erasing the data does not mean “erasing” the baptism
The scope of the case must in any event be distinguished from the sacramental reality of Baptism. What is at issue before the CJEU is the legal treatment of the personal data that allow the baptised person to be identified within a register, not the existence or validity of the sacrament received.
For the Catholic Church, validly administered Baptism imprints a sacramental character and cannot be repeated or undone later by the will of the baptised person. Any civil obligation to render certain data in a certificate illegible would therefore have no capacity to “erase” the Baptism.
The debate opened in Luxembourg is different: determining whether European data-protection rules can oblige a diocese, in certain circumstances and after weighing the conflicting rights, to erase the elements that allow a person to be identified in its sacramental registers.
For the time being, that question remains without a definitive answer. Medina’s conclusions are merely a legal proposal addressed to the Court. It will be the future CJEU judgment that establishes the interpretation of Union law that national courts must follow.