TRIBUNE. The Church and the trap of the common good

By Pedro Gómez Carrizo

TRIBUNE. The Church and the trap of the common good
Humpty Dumpty y Alicia, personajes de A través del espejo, de Lewis Carroll.

On the other side of the mirror, Alice learned how language works, and, in passing, the world. It was the conceited egg Humpty Dumpty who gave her the secret: “When I use a word,” he told her, “it means exactly what I want it to mean,” and then, in reply to the girl’s objection, he concluded: “The question is knowing who is in charge. That is all.”

Power charges words with meaning. And the ones that offer the greatest advantage to those in charge are those that sound so good that no one even thinks of questioning them. On the list are talismanic terms such as freedom, peace, human rights… and also, of course, the common good.

Because who could declare themselves an enemy of the common good? The answer is “no one,” and that should worry a Catholic, for depending on how it is defined, that common good should arouse all our rejection.

I will try to explain myself. Recently, on the occasion of Leo XIV’s speech on immigration in the Canaries, I was asked on the Tekton channel about the common good. My answer was that when the Pope used the “we” to urge the welcome of immigrants, from his idea of the “common good,” he was arrogating to himself the voice of a political community he does not represent. Because who are we that “we”? Catholics, who welcome because they know that Christ is the only king, or the secular State that designs and executes the welcome? It is not enough to gather us all under the same pronoun to turn us into a moral community.

That integration of immigrants is not carried out by a hypothetical Christian demos, but by the demos that actually exists, whose institutions, laws, and hierarchy of values respond to a conception of man that in many respects is radically contrary to that of the Church. So by invoking a “we” that presupposes a nonexistent community of ends, the Pope transferred the moral authority of the Church to policies that should never have deserved its support.

The key is that the grammatical “we” fabricates the illusion of a moral “we,” and under that fictitious identity the deception is consummated, I want to believe involuntarily. The pronoun is a part of speech with “occasional” meaning, that is: depending on the occasion, so will its sense be. In such a way that, by that sleight of hand, the Church may end up legitimizing, whether it wants to or not, policies that undermine the principles it is called to defend. And to sanction that legitimization, to make matters worse, convinced of faithfully fulfilling its mission.

We can console ourselves by thinking with Saint Thomas that the true common good refers to an objective moral order, prior and superior to the human will, which the political community has the duty to recognize and pursue. Very well. But the core is that those who legislate, educate our children, distribute budgets, and decide which behaviors deserve legal protection are the “we” that in effect materializes the “common good,” that same “common good” that has turned abortion into a right, legalized euthanasia, and redefined marriage.

Hence my apparent initial boutade: a Catholic must be willing to combat the common good that actually exists. Because that common good is not a philosophical abstraction, but the set of ends that a given society proposes to achieve and that its institutions turn into laws and public policies.

In a previous article, “Human Rights as a Golden Calf,” I tried to explain how the almost sacred prestige of human rights allows them to be turned into instruments for legitimizing any aberration. Detached from natural and divine law, those rights end up resting on the human will, expressed through a consensus whose objective definition corresponds to the dominant ideologies. Thus, the same label that should protect the inviolability of life ends up shielding its elimination. Human rights function as a sort of new decalogue of the contemporary civil religion, with the advantage that its commandments can be modified without the need to climb Sinai.

Norberto Bobbio maintained in The Age of Rights that the fundamental problem of human rights was not to justify them, but to protect them. An extraordinarily convenient way to spare oneself the decisive question: who determines what a right is and according to what foundation. Because when consensus takes the place of that foundation, whoever has the power to establish it also acquires a formidable capacity to decide what we must consider morally obligatory.

Something similar happens with the common good. Human rights legitimize individual claims; the common good provides legitimacy to collective projects. Power can thus invoke personal autonomy to recognize any subjective claim and, at the same time, demand sacrifices in the name of the interests of the community. The contradiction is apparent, because in both cases whoever is in charge retains the faculty to decide what each thing means. If in the Catholic tradition, the good must guide the “consensus”; in modernity, consensus ends up determining what is considered “good.” And a community can be perfectly cohesive around an error, even around a monstrosity.

For the rest, consensus has its administrators. The common good is for a certain political communitarianism what freedom represents for certain liberals: a principle of variable geometry. We already know the liberal who enthusiastically defends free competition from a position of advantage and suddenly discovers the virtues of protectionism when he loses it. The opportunistic communitarian experiences a similar conversion: from the minority he claims recognition of diversity; installed in power, he discovers that social cohesion requires sacrificing differences. Those of us who suffer Catalan nationalism know this well.

And this leads us to the most disconcerting thing: that the Church itself may be trapped in a logic that contradicts the foundations of its social doctrine. Because what does it mean to commit oneself to building the common good of a society that has ceased to share its conception of man?

The publication of Magnifica humanitas provides an especially timely reason to raise it. Historian Alberto Melloni has counted 67 appearances of the expression “common good” in 56 paragraphs of Leo XIV’s encyclical, distinguishing five different meanings, from the Thomistic to the one linked to social pluralism. In his judgment, such a multiplication of meanings ends up weakening the concept’s capacity for discernment.

In its number 11, the encyclical affirms that the common good must be built on the rock of the relationship with God, and in 60 it gathers its traditional definition, linked to the perfection of persons. But in 61 it appears as the fruit of social interdependence, while in 62 it proposes to configure through dialogue a “basis of consensus” that allows the constitution of a shared project. Next, the State is entrusted with guaranteeing the cohesion and unity necessary to pursue it. Even more striking is that number 59 presents the promotion of the common good as a “non-negotiable value,” comparable in that sense to the promotion of life.

Leo XIV does not go so far as to affirm that consensus determines moral truth, but neither does he explain how it is prevented that the practical realization of that common good remains subordinated to a political community built on an anthropology contrary to the Christian one. Because the State to which the Pope entrusts the guarantee of the cohesion necessary to carry out the shared project is not precisely that of Saint Louis of France.

In reality, power does not even need the Church to make its ends its own, for it suffices to empty the “common good” of its traditional content, refill it with the values of the dominant consensus, and get it to continue invoking it. Thus, out of fidelity to one of its principles, the Church ends up legitimizing its falsification.

Because the ill-fated consensus can lead a distracted Catholic to admit as good what is contrary to natural and divine law. The strategy is distraction, and it seems that there are many people in the Vatican dedicated to fostering it.

The Catechism recalls in its number 2242 that the Christian has the obligation to disobey the dispositions of civil authority contrary to the moral order. It would be astonishing if that same authority could turn into a duty of collaboration what requires resistance, by the simple procedure of baptizing its claims as “common good.”

Let us return to Humpty Dumpty. The question was knowing who is in charge. And those who are in charge have already decided what “common good” means; all that remains is for the Church to bless it.

Thus the trap will have been consummated: secularism will no longer need to combat Christian principles, because it will have succeeded in getting the Church itself, brandishing the banner of the common good, to do so for it.

Note: Articles published as Tribuna express the opinion of their authors and do not necessarily represent the editorial line of Infovaticana, which offers this space as a forum for reflection and dialogue.

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