On Friday, December 5, the Holy See confirmed the consecration of Father Francis Li Jianlin as bishop of the Apostolic Prefecture of Xinxiang, a decision that Rome presented as a step forward in the implementation of the Provisional Agreement with China, but which exposes the dark areas of a relationship marked by concessions, pressures, and diplomatic silences. The departure of the underground bishop Joseph Zhang Weizhu and the entry of a candidate approved by the Chinese government summarize, perhaps better than any other case, the contradictions of a pact that remains as fragile as it is confusing.
A prefecture paralyzed for years becomes a symbol of the diplomatic dilemma
Xinxiang has long been a territory of conflict between the underground Church and Chinese authorities. There, two realities coexisted: on one hand, a bishop appointed by the Vatican but never recognized by the State; on the other, a “diocese” fabricated by the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which functions as the religious arm of the Communist Party.
The appointment of Li Jianlin, accepted by Pope Leo XIV and recognized by Beijing, formally closes a period of institutional blockade. However, what appears to be a normalization also highlights the constant tension between a Church that wants to preserve its identity and a State that demands absolute control over all religious expression.
A resignation surrounded by questions
The resignation of Bishop Joseph Zhang—at 67 years old, an unusually early age for an episcopal retirement—is one of the elements that sow doubts in this case. For years, Zhang lived under surveillance, with periods of detention and movement restrictions. That his resignation is accompanied by a public statement aligned with the “sinicization” promoted by the government raises questions about the true nature of his decision.
Zhang’s defenders wonder if he had the freedom to accept the resignation or if it was the result of accumulated pressures, both from the State and from Vatican diplomacy. In a country where authorities control every aspect of religious life, such doubts cannot be dismissed lightly. Zhang’s figure thus becomes a reminder of the fragility—and sometimes vulnerability—of the shepherds who remain faithful to communion with Rome outside the official structures.
An appointment that reveals China’s strategy of fait accompli
In April, during the period of sede vacante following the death of Pope Francis, Chinese authorities unilaterally announced Li Jianlin as bishop of the “Diocese of Xinxiang,” an entity not recognized by the Holy See. The gesture was interpreted as a direct challenge, intended to show that the state machinery could advance without waiting for Rome.
The fact that Leo XIV later approved that same priest as bishop of the Vatican prefecture reveals to what extent the relationship between both sides develops on uneven ground. Rome tries to redirect situations created by the State; Beijing consolidates its decisions by presenting them as part of a dialogued process. Xinxiang illustrates that diplomatic game, where agreements are interpreted differently by each party.
The real pulse: who defines the structure of the Church in China
Behind the discussions about names, people, and protocol gestures lies the fundamental core of the conflict: the authority to define the ecclesial structure. In recent years, China has erected dioceses without Rome’s approval, modified boundaries, and even transferred bishops from one jurisdiction to another without pontifical mandate. For the Vatican, achieving state recognition of the Apostolic Prefecture of Xinxiang as the valid jurisdiction represents a significant diplomatic advance, however it leaves a sense of resignation.
This advance comes accompanied by an evident cost: the replacement of an underground bishop with one approved by the State. What is interpreted in Rome as a step toward normalization can be perceived in local communities as one more concession to Beijing’s pressures. Xinxiang once again puts on the table the problem that the 2018 agreement has not fully resolved: the tension between mutual recognition and state control over the Church.
Xinxiang reveals what the agreement cannot hide
What happened in Xinxiang synthesizes the latent tensions of the Vatican–China agreement. In the eyes of Vatican diplomacy, it is described as progress: an anomalous situation is regularized, a new crisis is avoided, and communication with Beijing is kept alive. But for the faithful who live their faith under surveillance, the message is more ambiguous. The question that this episode leaves is the same one that has accompanied the agreement since its origin: to what extent can Rome advance in dialogue without compromising the freedom of the Church and without sacrificing those who have sustained communion under conditions of persecution.
Xinxiang, more than a resolved case, is a mirror that reflects the deep contradictions of an agreement that remains, at the same time, necessary and tense.