Holiness, I am going to briefly expose to you the main errors that, at first glance, I have perceived in the magisterial note Una caro, from the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, whose text appears in italics.
79. Pope Francis (…) with healthy realism, warns of the danger of idealizing marital union with inadequate deductions, as if theological mysteries should find a perfect correspondence in the couple’s life, and this should be perfect in every circumstance. In reality, this would create a constant feeling of guilt in the more fragile spouses, who struggle and strive to the utmost to maintain their union: “It is not good to confuse different levels: one should not impose on two limited persons the enormous burden of having to perfectly reproduce the union that exists between Christ and his Church, because marriage as a sign implies a dynamic process, which advances gradually with the progressive integration of God’s gifts”.
The idealization of having to adjust to theological mysteries is criticized, when precisely the idealization consists in thinking that theological mysteries are mere ideas separated from reality and unattainable from it; but that is completely false, both with regard to theological mysteries, which must be recognized as completely objective realities— or are the Trinity and the Incarnation, for example, mere speculations without real content? —as with regard to moral principles, which, given the practical nature of morality, are also not mere ideals, but norms that must be actually fulfilled. The aberration derived from the idealizing conception of morality is to think that it would suffice to carry out, in practice, a certain and gradual approximation to the commandments for the acts to already be morally good; however, that goes against Catholic doctrine, which considers sinful in its matter every act that does not fully conform to the commandments, but contradicts them in some aspect, since the moral goodness of the act requires that of all its components, while for evil it suffices for only one element not to be good. Hence, the opposition between good and evil is not gradual but radical, while gradualness is only in the greater perfection of the good act or in the greater gravity of the bad act.
81. On the occasion of the Jubilee of Families, Grandparents and the Elderly, Pope Leo XIV, addressing spouses directly, reiterated that “marriage is not an ideal, but the canon of true love between man and woman: a total, faithful and fruitful love […]. By transforming them into one flesh, this same love makes them capable, in the image of God, of giving life” [111].
Indeed, marriage is not an ideal, nor are the moral norms that apply to it, since the force of normativity lies in the demand for actual fulfillment; therefore, a flagrant contradiction with what was stated earlier is observed here.
122. The person cannot be treated in a way that does not correspond to this dignity, which can be called “infinite”, both because of the unlimited love that God has for him and because it is an absolutely inalienable dignity. Every “human individual has the dignity of a person; he is not just something, but someone”. Consequently, the person “cannot be treated as an object of use and, therefore, as a means”.
The same grave error as in Dignitas infinita is incurred: considering that natural human dignity is infinite, for, although God’s love is spoken of, it is also true that what is absolutely inalienable must belong to what is likewise inalienable for every being: its nature, while, on the contrary, the supernatural can be lost, and the person condemned.
The consequence of an infinite natural human dignity is the dissolution of the entire supernatural order, with the denial of its gratuity on the part of God, who would be obliged to grant the infinite gift of salvation to the one he would have created with an infinite dignity and, therefore, with an infinite right as well.
Now, no matter how much man is a person, it must be noted that dignity, as a moral quality, does not belong directly to the person, but to the nature, which is the dynamic consideration of substance, which in turn is the subject or direct foundation of all accidents, while the person is the subject or term of relations.
If it were argued that relation is also an accident, it is replied by distinguishing between predicamental relation, which is properly accidental, and transcendental relation, which is not accidental, but the one that founds the very being of something; thus, for example, the relation of neighborhood is effectively an accidental relation, which would disappear with the simple change of domicile, while the relation of filiation is already transcendental, because it is intrinsic to the very being and, therefore, irrevocable.
The fundamental element of every relation is the person, also called subsistence or hypostasis, for, just as an arch rests on two pillars, the relation is based on two subjects, which are the properly related terms, and which act as immediate subjects of the substance and mediate—through the substance—of the accidents.
The personal level is the deepest and serves to explain, on the one hand, the Trinitarian mystery, in which there is one nature and three persons, for the Trinitarian relations are perfect because they completely constitute their own terms: the Trinitarian persons, thus not affecting—since the relative is the only non-limiting differentiation—the divine substance, which can then maintain total simplicity; and also, on the other hand, the Christological mystery, in which there are two natures and one person: the second Trinitarian, which is subject to two constitutive relations, although at different levels, one divine and one created. But moreover, it can serve to explain salvation as a real relation with God, which, as every relation, equalizes, placing on the same level the related terms. It cannot be directed to human nature, for its equivalent—the divine nature—is completely absolute, unable to enter into real relation with anything; but it could only be directed to the human person herself, to connect her with the already mentioned divine relative terms. In this way, just as the Trinitarian relations do not affect the divine nature, which, as has been indicated, remains intact in its simplicity, neither would the salvific relation affect either the divine nature or the human nature, which are incommensurable with each other due to the transcendence of the first. And, moreover, just as the one person of the Word can maintain two such disparate relations as the divine and the created, so also the human person could maintain two relations: the salvific one and that of her own created nature, whereby it is logically explained that salvation manages to cross the barrier of divine transcendence, impassable at the level of nature, to place the human person really before the divine persons.
The question now would be whether of this human person, who by herself has the possibility—also called “obediential potency”—fulfilled by salvation, of entering into real relation with the divine ones, an infinite dignity could be predicated, as is done in this document, and the answer must be decidedly negative; and not only because, as has been said, dignity always refers to nature, and moreover, as an act, it cannot be based on a mere potency, but also because the opposite would mean granting the human person by herself the right to real relation with God, since every dignity generates rights, and these demand—at least morally—their fulfillment. What for God, given his perfection, would be a metaphysical exigency, and that, obviously—and it can never be insisted upon enough—would end the gratuity of salvation and lead to the annulment of the supernatural order and even to pantheism.
Could no dignity of the human person then be predicated, who, through salvation, reaches real relation with God? Of course it could, only this dignity, to remain coherently at the level of nature—which is that of every quality—would no longer be the proper one of the human, which must always be finite, but of the divine, since, as St. Peter affirms, salvation makes us consorts of the divine nature (2 Pet 1:4), and that same consortium, based on the salvific relation, also communicates the dignity of the same divine nature. But does this not imply any pantheism? No, because, although some have wanted to avoid it by inadequately translating the quote as “partakers of the divine nature”—which, in reality, is imparticipable—the purely personal and moreover supernatural communication avoids any reference to created nature, which thus remains infinitely distant from the divine realm. Moreover, although the divine nature is communicated, what characterizes it principally is not communicated: necessity, and that because necessity requires that the two terms be necessary; which, by not being fulfilled with the saved person—who depends on her free acceptance—causes the whole process to be only possible. And how can the divine nature be communicated and its constitutive note, necessity, not be communicated? Because necessity is an absolute note, by opposing the impossibility of nothingness, which is also absolute, while salvific communication is totally relative, by occurring between pure terms—the divine ones and the saved one—so that, while the former are necessary, with their consequent constitutive relations for the constitution, in turn, of divinity, the following term is not necessary, because it is free; which, as has been said, makes its relation also free or merely possible.
Against the application of an infinite natural dignity to man, I already provided in a previous letter quite a few magisterial quotes, but now I would like to add one more:
Dz 2290: Let those who do not wish to stray from the genuine doctrine and true magisterium of the Church hold as a general and indisputable norm that they must reject, in the case of this mystical union, every form of it that makes the faithful in any way transgress the order of created things, and erroneously invade the divine, so that one of the attributes of the eternal Divinity could be said of them as proper. And moreover, they shall firmly and with all certainty maintain that in these things everything is common to the Most Holy Trinity, since everything refers to God as to the supreme efficient cause.
Is there, after necessity, a more proper attribute of divinity than infinity, when by simple reason we already know that God is the only unlimited being, and the negation of all limitation is precisely what indicates infinity? But precisely the problem of applying infinity, in some way, to human nature would be the consequent necessity, which would oblige God to grant salvation. How then will it not be impious to consider naturally infinite, and consequently necessary, a being that is not the divine one?
123. The other, who has the same dignity and, therefore, the same rights.
If it is recognized here that every dignity entails a right, is it so difficult to understand that an infinite dignity entails infinite rights as well, and that, if it is a natural dignity with its corresponding natural rights, then the entire supernatural order becomes unnecessary, due to the inherent necessity of the natural, and strictly disappears?
145. An integral vision of conjugal charity does not deny its fruitfulness, the possibility of generating new life, because “this totality, demanded by conjugal love, also corresponds to the demands of responsible fruitfulness”. Sexual union, as a way of expressing conjugal charity, must naturally remain open to the communication of life, although this does not mean that it must be an explicit objective of every sexual act. In fact, three legitimate situations can occur: (…)
b) That a couple does not consciously seek a particular sexual act as a means of procreation. Wojtyła also affirms this, holding that a conjugal act, which “being in itself an act of love that unites two persons”, does not necessarily have to be considered by them as a conscious and desired means of procreation.”
What is morally important is to recognize the intrinsic evil of intentionally separating sexual union from the generating possibility, and that is not said explicitly. It is also true that, since openness to life is intrinsic and connatural to authentic spousal love, one cannot strictly speak of an authentic spousal act that lacks all procreative consciousness, since man comes to see woman as wife by seeing her as mother of his own children, and woman comes to see man as husband by seeing him as father of her own children. Hence, the conscious exclusion of this capacity gravely undermines the authenticity of spousal love.
c) That the couple respects the natural periods of infertility. Following this line of reflection, as St. Paul VI affirms, “the Church teaches that it is lawful to take into account the natural rhythms inherent in the generative functions for the use of marriage only in the infertile periods”. This can serve not only to “regulate birth”, but also to choose the most suitable moments to welcome a new life. In the meantime, the couple can take advantage of these periods “as a manifestation of affection and to safeguard mutual fidelity. In this way, they give proof of true and completely honest love”.
The truth is that, when already—according to the interpretation made by the Argentine bishops of Amoris laetitia—those who maintain sexual relations within an irregular cohabitation situation can come to participate in the sacraments, the intention that legitimate spouses put into those same relations, and even the means they use, become practically irrelevant, since the very notion of “grave sin”, which prevents fruitful reception of the Eucharist and also, if there is no purpose of amendment, of penance, has become meaningless, as seen in the fact that he who grants the most also grants the least.
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